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Abstract
This article argues that there are systemic reasons for the role of banks in recent
financial crises and for the fraudulent behaviour of bank employees. It links them to efforts
to turn traditional and conservative banking institutions into modern and more aggressive
businesses. The article shows in some detail how critiques of the banking sector and its hu-
man resources practices arose in the １９５０s, leading since the late １９６０s to a fundamental
transformation of large banks in a growing number of countries, starting with the US and
the UK. It also highlights the major role played by the consulting firm McKinsey & Com-
pany in（a）familiarizing bankers with management terminology and thinking drawn from
industrial firms such as General Motors,（b）copying the latter’s decentralized organizational
structure as well as their incentive and control systems into the banking sector, and（c）
prompting the banks to hire more MBA graduates. While these changes gave bank employ-
ees supposedly more autonomy and accountability, the profitability goals set from the top ul-
timately drove them into ever more risky behaviour. However, as the many subsequent cri-
ses and scandals have shown, selling a loan is not at all like selling a car.
Keywords: Lehman Shock, managerialization, multidivisional structure（M-form）, incentives,
self-perception, McKinsey & Company
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Introduction: Banks, bankers and crises
Banks have always been“special”― for a number of reasons（Benston ２００４）.
Among these reasons, their fundamental role for economic growth and modernization, as
part of the broader financial system, has been and continues to be of particular importance
（e.g. Sylla２００２）. This role also explains the significant attention that authorities of different
kinds ― including religions and governments ― have always paid to banks and finance more
generally（Homer and Sylla２００５; Cassis et al. ２０１６）. At no times is the fundamental role of
banks in the economy more apparent than during the recurrent financial and banking crises
（e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff ２００９; Cassis ２０１１）. The latest crisis occurred in ２００７―２００８, with
some of its effects enduring today. It has been called“Lehman shock”in Japan and is
known elsewhere as the“Global Financial Crisis（GFC）”or, given its negative repercussions
on the economies of many countries, as the“Great Recession”― in reference to the devastat-
ing“Great Depression”of the１９３０s（see, for a comparison of the two, Temin２０１０）.
While the effects of this latest major crisis were indeed widespread, touching most
countries and most sectors of economic activity, banks did play a crucial role at its origin.
An indication for this can be found in the reasons that prompted the Japanese to refer to
the crisis as“Lehman shock”. Lehman Brothers was the fourth largest investment bank in
the United States before succumbing to the crisis in September２００８. Bear Stearns, another
investment bank and securities broker, became insolvent already in March２００８but was ac-
quired by JP Morgan Chase before going bankrupt. The deeper origins of the crisis and
these collapses can be traced to regional banking in the United States, where people were
enticed to purchase homes that they were unable to afford by offering them promotional
mortgage rates below the so-called“prime”rate. These sub-prime mortgages were then
bundled and, with the complicity of the rating agencies, sold to investors as highly-rated se-
curities by investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. When rates went
up after the promotional period ended, many of these homeowners defaulted, rendering the
related securities largely worthless and, more importantly, choking trust within the financial
system, which came to a screeching halt（Gorton and Metrick２０１２）. As a result, banks with
a high exposure to these ― now largely worthless ― asset-backed securities, like Lehman
Brothers and Bear Stearns, collapsed, while others considered“too large to fail”due to their
systemic role（see above）, were rescued by governments in many countries, though fore-
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most in the US and the UK, at enormous expense to the taxpayer（Langley２０１５）.
Like in previous crises, much of the blame for these developments and the banking
failures was laid at the doorsteps of regulators or, rather, those governments that had de-
cided to deregulate the banking sector since the１９８０s（e.g. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion２０１１; Slovik２０１２）, with technological changes seen as a facilitating factor. And the con-
sequential reaction was an attempt to re-regulate, for instance with the Dodd-Frank Act in
the United States ― now being slowly hollowed out and dismantled ― or the so-called Basel
III rules, which are requiring banks to increase their reserves to be able to better withstand
future shocks（https:／／www.bis.org／bcbs／basel３.htm）. In the search for those responsible,
the broader public also pinpointed“Wall Street”and“bankers”, whose reputation sank to
new lows after the ２００８ crisis（Owens ２０１２）. This should not be surprising given that
fraudulent or at least reckless behaviour had already caused bank failures in the past:
Among the more recent cases are Nick Leeson, who brought down the venerable British
Barings bank in １９９５ or Je´ro＾me Kerviel and Bruno Iksil, the“London Whale”, who caused
multibillion dollar losses to, respectively, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale in ２００８ and JP Morgan in ２０１２.
However, the only conviction of a banking executive, Rebecca Mairone, as part of a case
against Bank of America, was overturned in ２０１６（Corkery ２０１６a）. Mairone, who has since
used her maiden name Steele, had been responsible for a lending program tellingly referred
to as“High Speed Swim Lane”or“hustle”at Countrywide Bank, which was acquired by
Bank of America in２００８, after it ran into financial trouble because of these practices. Never-
theless, several banks, including Bank of America, paid huge fines to settle lawsuits related
to the financial crisis ― though without admitting any guilt.
The question asked in this article is whether insufficient or lax regulation and the
reckless or fraudulent behaviour of some individuals have been the only culprits when it
comes to banks and bankers harming the interests of their customers, their own organiza-
tion and ― in extreme cases ― the economy as a whole. As a recent case shows, tighter regu-
lation has clearly not prevented this kind of behaviour, though the increasing scrutiny has at
least managed to uncover it. Thus, since ２０１１ at Wells Fargo, the third largest US bank by
assets, employees had signed up close to two million customers for additional, fee generating
services without their consent, including credit cards, new accounts and online banking,
even creating fake email accounts for the latter. According to one report,“［r］egulators said
the bank’s employees had been motivated to open the unauthorized accounts by compensa-
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tion policies that rewarded them for opening new accounts; many current and former Wells
employees told regulators they had felt extreme pressure to open as many accounts as pos-
sible”（Corkery２０１６b）.
This case not only shows the persistence of such behaviour, it also points to its pos-
sible origins, since it seems quite similar to what motivated bank employees to sell sub-
prime mortgages ― though in this case it did not lead to a global financial and economic cri-
sis, only to a１８５million US dollar fine for Wells Fargo and the resignation of its CEO. Given
its sheer scale, this behaviour is clearly not driven by personal financial pressures, which
were found, in a recent exploratory study, to motivate occasional fraudulent acts at lower
levels of the banking hierarchy（Hollow ２０１４）. That same study also suggests that at more
senior levels“personal financial considerations tend to come second to those of the organisa-
tion as a whole”（p. １７４）. The question therefore becomes what is driving banks and their
executives to create these kinds of pressures on their employees. Or, put differently, is there
a systemic reason for these practices, which regulation seems unable to eradicate？
A possible answer can be found in a study examining the origins of the Swedish
banking crisis in the early １９９０s. Thus, while also pointing to deregulation as a root cause,
Engwall（１９９４）went further than other observers（e.g. Englund １９９９）, highlighting what
has been called mimetic behaviour（DiMaggio and Powell １９８３）by bankers, in this case“a
general idea that the banks, which were seen as old, traditional and conservative institu-
tions, should modernize themselves by adopting the mode of behaviour shown by large in-
dustrial companies”（Engwall１９９４:２３４）. This, he suggested, was in particular“the message
preached by successful industrial leaders, consultants（such as the Boston Consulting Group
and McKinsey）and in the strategy literature”and included, more specifically, attempts to
improve the ratio between revenues and costs by growing the former through aggressive
sales and marketing efforts. Engwall（１９９４）compared this change to the bankers, who had
been playing bridge all their life, now trying their hand at poker ― though with only a rudi-
mentary knowledge of the rules. Excited to play the new game, they kept raising the stakes
and taking ever more risks ― ultimately causing the crisis. The necessary government bail-
out ― where the same consultants that had originally suggested the behavioural changes to
the banks were now asked to help restructure them ― is estimated to have cost the Swedish
taxpayers around two per cent of GDP（Englund１９９９）.
While Engwall’s（１９９４）explanation seems compelling, he provides only limited evi-
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dence, especially when it comes to the ways in which apparent role models, consultants, and
the business media fomented the changes in the behaviour of the Swedish bankers. What
the present article attempts to show, based on earlier work with various co-authors（esp.
Kipping and Westerhuis ２０１２; ２０１４; Engwall, Kipping and U¨sdiken ２０１６）is, first of all, that
the changes leading to the Swedish and other banking crises are related to the“manageri-
alization”of the banking sector. Secondly, the article will also show that banks and bankers
in other countries espoused these changes almost two decades prior to their Swedish coun-
terparts. And last not least, the article will confirm that consultants, and in particular
McKinsey & Company, played a crucial role in this process ― further dissecting this role
through an in-depth case study. The remainder of this paper will first contextualize the
banking specific developments by summarizing the expansion of the notion and practice of
“management”since the late１９th century. Next, the paper will demonstrate how consultants
played a paramount role in introducing this notion and the related practices into the bank-
ing sector by changing not only the beliefs and self-perceptions of bankers but also by intro-
ducing the corresponding organizational structures and incentive systems. The final section
will discuss the long-term consequences of these changes and how they might be addressed
going forward.
Context: The mangerialization of everything during the ２０th century
The origin of the word“management”, if one is to believe its etymology in a num-
ber of reputable dictionaries can be found in the Latin word“manus”or hand and in the
Italian term“maneggiare”, which refers to the handling of horses. Early uses of the word
referring to organizations and those directing them can be found in the １８th century ― with
the organization actually being the church. Examples include a sermon highlighting“the
duty of a Christian church to manage their affairs with charity”and a critical treatise offer-
ing“a pleasant account of the humours, management and principles of the great Pontif［i.e.
pope］Machiavel”（see, for details and references, Engwall et al.２０１６:１―２）. The first bestsel-
ling book with“management”in its title was published in London in １８６１ by Isabella Bee-
ton: Beeton’s Book of Household Management sold two million copies in less than ten years and
is still in print. But it was essentially a cook book, even if also providing some suggestions
for how to handle household staff（Russell２０１０）.
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Until at least the early２０th century, activities closer to what we would call manage-
ment today were usually referred to as“commerce”or“business”. Thus, the first programs
teaching skills for those working in the growing number of business undertakings since the
early １９th century were called commerce degrees and the increasing number of institutions
offering such degrees in many European countries as well as Japan were generally named
“schools of commerce”. The Paris-based École Spéciale de Commerce et d’Industrie founded in
１８１９― predecessor of today’s École Supérieure de Commerce de Paris（ESCP）― is widely seen
as the first of its kind. Similar schools in North America also used the commerce label until
the foundation of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University in
１９０８ introduced a new and lasting terminology as well as a novel degree, the Master of
Business Administration（MBA）. The business school term and the MBA degree have since
been gradually espoused around the world, especially after World War II, with Meiji’s
Graduate School of Business Administration established in １９５３ being among the Japanese
pioneers（Engwall et al. ２０１６: Chs. ４ and７）. The first journals dedicated to management as
a topic were started in１９２２and also had business in their title: the Harvard Business Review
and the Journal of Business, the latter published by the University of Chicago Press in con-
junction with Cambridge University Press, Maruzen in Tokyo and the Commercial Press in
Shanghai（ibid., p.１３９; the journal folded in２００６）.
Management as a term first became more widely used due to the notion of“scien-
tific management”. Derived from the title of a book published by Frederick Winslow Taylor
in１９１１, The Principles of Scientific Management, the term covered a wide range of systems to
measure and improve labour productivity that were developed, promoted and applied by
Taylor himself, his acolytes as well as his many imitators and competitors, most of whom
worked as independent consultants rather than within specific organizations. While scientific
management might have ultimately contributed to a deskilling of labour（Braverman １９７４）,
Taylor and many other proponents of scientific management saw their systems as a way to
reconcile the conflicts between owners-managers and workers through the use of scientific
methods. Some also envisioned it as a blueprint for better organized and more just societies
― unintentionally helping to give rise to technocratic and totalitarian regimes（Maier １９７０）.
Scientific management became a global phenomenon during the first decades of the２０th cen-
tury, but the translation of the term generally reflects its focus on the shop floor, with the
French organisation scientifique du travail or“scientific organization of work”a telling exam-
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Figure １: Share of the word“M／management”in Google Books, １８００―２０００
ple. Equally tellingly, the increasing number of consultants selling these systems were gen-
erally known, even in English, as“efficiency engineers”― confirming the embeddedness of
early management within engineering（e.g. Shenhav１９９９）.
A turning point in terms of the terminology came during and after World War II
and is exemplified by the different English titles for the translations of the １９１６ treatise by
the French mining executive Henri Fayol, Administration industrielle et générale ― today con-
sidered one of the early classics on how to manage. Pitman of London published both trans-
lations but while remaining true to the French original in １９３０ with Industrial and General
Administration, the １９４９ version was renamed General and Industrial Management（see Eng-
wall et al. ２０１６: ２９２）, reflecting the growing notion that management was a“general”skill
applicable to different sectors, including, since the １９８０s, to the public sector in the form of
“new public management”（e.g. Hood１９９１）. In between these two translations, the belief in
the importance of management had received a major boost with the success of the United
States in World War II and was spread globally by public and private US actors in its after-
math（e.g. Kipping and Bjarnar １９９８; Kudo, Kipping and Schro¨ter ２００４）. The following
graph broadly reflects this expansion of the term“management”with a more modest in-
crease since the early２０th century and an acceleration from the１９４０s onwards.
The emergence and expansion of the practice of management and of identifiable
roles for managers both in organizations and in society saw a similar trajectory. Some schol-
ars have sought parallels for today’s practices in ancient times, while others have drawn at-
tention to large-scale shipbuilding or manufacturing establishments or to the global trading
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companies of the pre-industrial period as predecessors for today’s big businesses. But most
would concur that it was the so-called first industrial revolution originating in the UK in the
late １８th century and, even more so, the second industrial revolution, spreading first in the
US about a century later, that led to the establishment of clearly identifiable and ever more
diversified management positions. In textile mills with thousands of workers, then steel mills
and later automobile plants, employing tens or even hundreds of thousands, owners increas-
ingly had to rely on salaried managers to introduce, supervise and enforce standardized poli-
cies and procedures, covering ever wider ranges of activities, from procurement to produc-
tion and sales. Managers became even more central after the ownership of these large firms
started to disperse（Berle and Means１９３２）, though they were also present in family-owned
businesses. And they transferred patterns of behaviour and values from corporations into
society at large（Zunz１９９０）.
Managerial ranks saw their most significant expansion with the introduction of
what has since been called the multidivisional or M-form: decentralized organizations con-
sisting of several geographically or product-based divisions and a corporate center making
strategic decisions ― and monitoring them using planning processes combined with detailed
budgetary and financial controls. These organizations were meant to deal with the“adminis-
trative overload”caused by increasing diversification, competition, and complexity ― par-
tially by adding large swathes of middle managers in both line and staff functions（Chandler
１９６２; see also Drucker１９４６）. Originally developed during the interwar period ― largely inde-
pendently ― by four US-based companies, DuPont, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jer-
sey and Sears Roebuck, the M-form spread quickly, first in the United States and then, after
World War II, also in Europe（for an overview, see Whittington and Mayer ２０００; Kipping
and Westerhuis２０１２）. And it was often introduced with the assistance of a new generation
of management consultants, who had emerged during the interwar period under the label
“management engineers”but offered services pertaining to organization and, since the
１９６０s, strategy rather than the shop floor. Among the most prominent of these was McKin-
sey & Company, which had originally been established in Chicago in １９２６ by accounting
professor James O. McKinsey, but was gradually refashioned after his untimely death in
１９３７ by partners in the New York office with an increasing focus on top-level advice
（McDonald２０１３）.
In the UK alone, where we have some data, McKinsey was involved in２２of the３２
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cases, where the １００ largest industrial companies had used consultants for their decentrali-
zation during the １９６０s（Channon １９７３; see also Kipping １９９９）. And McKinsey also spear-
headed the managerialization of the largest banks in many countries, as the following sec-
tion will discuss in some detail.
Banks as latecomers: How they eventually became managerialized
Thus, managerialization spread rapidly to industrial organizations throughout the
interwar period and even more so during and after WWII. Banks, however, remained differ-
ent in terms of their recruitment and training as well as their overall organization and the
ways they made decisions. This is well documented by two empirical studies of human rela-
tions in banking from the １９５０s, both published in the recently established Administrative
Science Quarterly（Argyris１９５８; McMurry１９５８; see also Argyris１９５４）. The first was a case
study of a single, anonymous bank conducted by Chris Argyris, who became one of the pio-
neers of research into organization development and the“learning organization”. At the
time, he was based at Yale University’s Labor and Management Center and later, in １９７１,
moved to the Harvard Business School. The second study drew on interviews with about
９００ employees in both investment and commercial banks, ６００ of whom were also adminis-
tered tests regarding their mental abilities, preferences and values. Its author, Robert N.
McMurry, was a trained psychologist and a partner in a small management consulting firm,
McMurry, Hamstra and Company.
In the introduction to his article, McMurry makes the underlying questions of his
and, by extension, Argyris’research very plain:“the nature of banking as a business; the
bank’s special place in its community; and, as a result, the type of person who is attracted to
banking as a career”. He also contrasts banks with“most commercial enterprises which
function in a competitive environment”, whereas“a bank is an institution characterized by
dignity and conservatism”. Here, he suggests that banks have“some of the qualities of a ju-
ridical or governing body”（McMurry １９５８: ８８）, while, a bit later in the article, he even
speaks of a“cathedrallike milieu”（p.９０）, where“［e］xcept at the very top levels of manage-
ment no decision making or risk taking of consequence is required of anyone”（p.８９）. What
does this mean for the people hired by these institutions, which is the main focus of both
studies? According to McMurry, they are those“with a passive-dependent-submissive type
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of personality configuration”（p. ９０）, while the few“aggressive young people”entering the
bank“by chance”, would quickly leave again（p. ９４）. Incidentally, a company history of the
First National City Bank in New York, the future Citibank, which became one of the first to
introduce an M-form（see below）, noted that, before,“training had been on the job, a slow,
cumulative process”and that an attempt in the mid-１９５０s to bring in MBA graduates from
the Harvard Business School had proved“futile”（Cleveland and Huertas１９８５:２８４―２８５）.
Both studies come to similar conclusions, namely that these past practices, includ-
ing the recruitment of“employees of the‘right type’”, were no longer adequate for the
banks given a changing environment, marked by“increasing competition both among them-
selves and with outside agencies”. The consequences for McMurry（１９５８:１０６）are very ob-
vious:“Banking must become more dynamic and aggressive. It can no longer survive on its
dignity as an‘institution.’This change requires strong chief executive officers, supported
by a staff which is more creative and dynamic than those revealed in our research.”While
probably intent on drumming up business for his own consulting firm, McMurry turned out
to be a prophet ahead of his time and it was only about a decade later that banks were fi-
nally pushed down this path towards managerialization. And it was a different consulting
firm, McKinsey & Company, that did most of the pushing ― though with very similar argu-
ments.
As noted above, McKinsey was part of a new type of consulting firms that
emerged in the interwar period, focusing on management of the whole organization, not just
the shop floor. Under the leadership of Marvin Bower, who held graduate degrees from Har-
vard in both law and business and was the firm’s managing director between１９５０and１９６７
and its eminence grise until his retirement in １９９２ and beyond, McKinsey started to hire
MBAs and to internally mimic leading law firms and to externally focus on advice to top
managers（McKenna２００６; McDonald２０１３）. As a result, it became heavily involved in divi-
sionalizing and managerializing many industrial firms first in the US and then, with much
success, in Western Europe ― a fact already noted by Chandler（１９６２）and explored in some
more detail in subsequent research（see, among others, Kipping １９９９; McKenna ２００６）. Its
foray into the banking sector has found much less attention though it was equally if not
more extensive as the following, still largely preliminary table shows, which is based on the
extant literature and ongoing research.
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Table １: Projects introducing the M-form in banking in chronological order
Period Bank Country Consultant Source
１９６７―１９６９ First National City USA McKinsey Cleveland & Huertas １９８５; Zweig １９９５
１９６７―１９７２ National
Westminster
UK McKinsey Channon １９７７; own research
１９６８―１９７８ AMRO NL McKinsey Arnoldus ２０００; Arnoldus & Dankers
２００５; Kipping & Westerhuis ２０１２
１９６９―１９７２
１９７４―１９７５
Barclays UK McKinsey Channon １９７７; Ackrill & Hannah ２００１
１９６９―１９７２ Dresdner Bank D McKinsey Own research
１９７０―１９７３ Cre´dit Lyonnais France McKinsey;
CEGOS
Own research
１９７１―１９７３ Lloyds UK McKinsey＊ Channon １９７７
１９７１―１９７３ Midland UK McKinsey Channon １９７７; Holmes & Green １９８６
１９７１ Nationwide UK McKinsey Cassell １９８４
１９７２ ABN NL Arthur D Little Arnoldus ２０００; Arnoldus & Dankers
２００５; Kipping & Westerhuis ２０１２
１９７２ Rabobank NL Berenschot Arnoldus & Dankers ２００５
１９７２ Banco de Bilbao Spain Urwick Intl Own research
１９７９ Sumitomo Bank Japan McKinsey Anon. １９９９; McDonald ２０１３
１９８０s Multiple banks Sweden McKinsey et al. Engwall １９９４
１９８０s Multiple banks Italy McKinsey Own research
Notes : ＊Consultant not named; likely to be McKinsey, based on mimetic effects.
McKinsey’s interest in spreading the M-form to the banking sector seems to have
originated in１９６７and was driven initially by its New York-based partner E. Everett Smith.
We know little about his previous activities, except for a book that he co-edited, with the
Dean of Columbia’s Graduate School of Business between１９５４and１９６９, Courtney C. Brown,
based on an event at the school（Brown and Smith １９５７）. Maybe it is no coincidence that
the school also sponsored a commercial bank management program in November １９５９.
Smith’s first known public statements regarding bank management are from１９６７, when he
gave a speech before the American Bankers Association, which was subsequently published
in modified forms in the McKinsey Quarterly under the title“Bank Management: The Unmet
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Challenge”（Smith １９６７）and in The Banker , a magazine published monthly in London and
read by bankers around the world. Another speech in １９６８, this time to the ４３rd National
Conference of the National Association for Bank Audit was again published in the McKinsey
Quarterly under the title“Tomorrow’s Banker: Professional or Businessman？”（Smith
１９６８）. The consulting firm also wrote a much more detailed report for the Trustees of the
Banking Research Fund at the Association of Reserve City Bankers entitled“Developing
Future Bank Management”. While that report is dated April１９６８, the underlying work was
conducted earlier and might have underpinned many of the ideas in Smith’s speeches and
publications.
Whatever the exact timeline, the ideas and suggestions contained in these publica-
tions and the report provide the rationale and form a kind of“blueprint”for the subsequent
changes in bank organizations carried out by McKinsey（see, for more details, Kipping and
Westerhuis ２０１４）. This is also apparent from the fact that copies of some or all of these
documents can be found in many of the bank archives, indicative of how McKinsey used
them to shape perceptions and discussions with their clients. What Smith and McKinsey
convey is a line of argument remarkably similar to the one put forward by McMurry（１９５８）
a decade earlier, highlighting namely broad changes in the banking sector that were leading
to more competition, the insufficiency of extant structures and staff to address these chal-
lenges and the resulting need to transform the organization of the banks, their incentive sys-
tems and, importantly, the“type”of people they recruit. What was added though, and
might have been crucial to the success of their overall push, as compared to the failure of
McMurry’s efforts, was a comparison with industry as the model to emulate ― something
Engwall（１９９４）also pointed out in his examination of the Swedish case.
Such a comparison had become possible ― and easy ― following the publication of
the memoirs of long-time General Motors President, Chairman and CEO Alfred P. Sloan in
１９６４, where he quite extensively described the organizational changes made during the in-
terwar period ― analysed more systematically first by Drucker（１９４６）and then by Chandler
（１９６２）, with the latter apparently also having a hand in the writing of My Years with General
Motors（McDonald and Seligman２００３）. In his various speeches, Smith made repeated men-
tions of Sloan and, more importantly, drew explicit parallels between the situation facing in-
dustrial firms in the interwar years and banks at the time focusing notably on the growing
scale, complexity, and diversification of banking activities:
―― 経 営 論 集 ――３８
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｔ 2018.02.28 14.54.38 Page 342
But now that they have moved from a profession to a business, the circumstances have
changed. Bankers have left the quiet backwaters of the traditional money banking busi-
ness and are well out in the stream of the business conglomerate. The currents are
strong and often tricky. If the boat is allowed to drift, control will be lost. The complexi-
ties and competitive forces that caused industrialists to address themselves to manage-
ment principles and practices back in the１９２０s are looming up before the managers of
today’s banking conglomerates.（Smith１９６８:５５）
One should note the use of imagery related to rivers run wild and the not quite so
subtle threat of control loss, with the creation of“fear”, according to Ernst and Kieser
（２００２）, being a fairly standard mechanism used by consultants to get managers to hire
them ― even making them“addicted”to their services. But the parallels with industry not
only served as a way to highlight the threat, it also offered the way out, which Smith（１９６７:
３７―３８）highlights by contrasting the two ― with the positive attributes reserved for indus-
try. It should be remembered that his speech to the American Bankers Association, from
which the following quote is taken, is likely to have reached a wide audience, since it was
published, as noted, both in the McKinsey Quarterly and The Banker :
As a logical consequence of knowing its profit economics and putting that knowledge to
work in profit planning and budgeting, the typical corporation is characterized by a
much greater emphasis on objective, quantifiable appraisal of management performance
and on personal accountability for results. Banks, by and large, tend toward subjective
performance appraisal based on trait evaluation. As a result, they blunt the potential im-
pact of positive and negative incentives, and end up with a markedly less competitive
and aggressive atmosphere than we find in the well-managed industrial organization.
The logic presented here can only lead to one rather obvious conclusion, i.e. that
banks had to espouse some of the same management principles and tools that had appar-
ently helped industrial firms like GM address similar challenges during the interwar period.
However, according to Smith（１９６８:４９）, in banking“the range of managerial skills required
is very considerable, even by industrial standards”and included“service design, marketing
strategy, facilities location, fee levels, manpower planning and development, budgetary con-
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trol, and computer system capability. Moreover, so Smith continued, an effective structure
must be provided to lead, control, and coordinate these activities”, which sounded much like
what Fayol had said about the task of a manager（see above）. But while Smith（１９６８: ５０）
highlighted the existence of a“common core of organizational principles and management
techniques shared by leading companies in the most diverse kinds of industrial enterprise”,
he believed that it would“take some fairly drastic philosophical and policy changes to effec-
tively apply business management principles and organization structure to the job of run-
ning a banking conglomerate”（Smith １９６８: ５３）. He also stressed that these changes could
not rely on extant personal given the absence of“true managers”but required“a whole
new level of management devoted to the full-time job of directing and administrating its in-
creasingly conglomerate undertaking”（p.５２）.
Smith and McKinsey were given the opportunity to put all these suggestions into
practice since mid-１９６７, when the consulting firm started a project at the First National City
Bank, predecessor of today’s Citibank, in the US and the Westminster Bank in the UK,
which merged with National Provincial to create National Westminster or NatWest the fol-
lowing year. Unsurprisingly, in both cases, they stressed the need for a more decentralized,
M-form-type organization combined with a more managerial approach. Thus, at Citibank,
their preliminary report asked two, ultimately rhetorical questions, clearly pointing in that
direction:“１. Is Citibank organized soundly ― and for optimum profits ― against the separate
markets it serves？ ２. Is Citibank organized to provide sufficient top-management direction
to its evolution as a financial conglomerate？”（quoted by Cleveland and Huertas１９８５:２７９）.
As the bank’s history highlights, introducing a new organizational structure was only part
of the solution;“to make it run First National City needed managers, many of them”and,
since these managers no longer received the“slow, cumulative”on the job training, while
having increased responsibilities, an incentive and control system was put in place to direct
their behaviour towards increasing profits（pp. ２８４―２８７）. At Westminster Bank, McKinsey
was originally brought in to help increase profitability. However, following the merger that
created NatWest, the consultants managed to focus attention on a supposed need to change
the organizational structure. They created domestic, international and related financial serv-
ices divisions, with the former subdivided further into regions and areas, all of which re-
quired additional managers. McKinsey wrote the job descriptions, participated in their selec-
tion as well as their training and, like at Citibank, also developed the necessary incentive
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and control systems（Channon１９７７:５６―５８; own research）.
The case that has been studied most extensively is the Dutch AMRO bank（Ar-
noldus２０００; Arnoldus and Dankers２００５; Kipping and Westerhuis２０１２;２０１４）. Here, McKin-
sey was hired in １９６８ to work on the structure of an organization that resulted from the
merger of the Amsterdamsche and Rotterdamsche Banks in１９６４but continued to have two
headquarters and two Chairmen. AMRO is a particularly interesting case, because the no-
tion of an all-powerful Chief Executive and, more generally, of“management”was less com-
monplace in the Netherlands, where organizations relied even more so than elsewhere on
collective decision-making ― though both Chairmen were familiar with the US model and at
least one of them had also looked at the re-organization of the Anglo-Dutch oil company
Shell, which was McKinsey’s first client in Europe（Kipping １９９９）. Moreover, McKinsey
worked at AMRO for over ten years developing an exclusive relationship ― with the bank
even prohibiting McKinsey from taking on other clients in the Dutch banking sector during
this period（Arnoldus２０００）.
What this case shows in enlightening detail are the almost heroic efforts by McKin-
sey to make those“philosophical and policy changes”that Smith had referred to in his
speeches and publications（see above）. Thus, after initial interviews with the members of
the bank’s top level, collegial decision-making body, the Raad van Bestuur or Board of Gover-
nors, the consultants noted in their own words,“a minor communications gap surrounding
such complex words as policy formulation, accountability, strategic planning, management
and so forth”. This“communications gap”was clearly all but minor, since the consultants
decided to address it before proceeding with the re-organization and the introduction of the
related management tools. To do so, they provided all the board members with a copy of
the book The Will to Manage written by McKinsey’s managing director Marvin Bower in
１９６６, which, again in their own words,“is an easy, conversationally styled book to read and
defines all the terms we generally employ”（for details, see Kipping and Westerhuis ２０１４:
３８７）. And throughout the remainder of the project they made major efforts to propel“the
development of a common management philosophy, serving as a guiding principle（in Dutch:
rode draad, literally translated as red thread）for the whole business and aligning the daily
activities of bank employees at all levels towards a common goal”（ibid.）.
This philosophy evolved around the notion of individuals being autonomous in their
decision-making and accountable for the results ― though based on goals set by the organi-
―― How Bankers Became Managers ― and is that a good thing? ―― ４１
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｔ 2018.02.28 14.54.38 Page 345
zation. This was a major break with the traditional operating principles in the banking sec-
tor, described by, among others, McMurry（１９５８）, where decisions were made collectively
in various committees and individual risk-taking was discouraged. This fundamental change
in self-perception and behaviour from being“bankers”to being“managers”― or using
Engwall’s（１９９４）metaphor from playing bridge to playing poker ― led to discussions in all
the banks being divisionalized. In the case of a German bank, for instance, McKinsey was
forced in to elaborate extensively on the alleged advantages of individual responsibility
（Eigenverantwortung）over the hitherto applied collegiality principle（Kollegialitätsprinzip）.
But despite some misgivings and resistance, apparent for example in a letter addressed to
the management board in the case of that bank, McKinsey’s vision ― and language ― ulti-
mately prevailed in all instances studied so far（see also Cassell １９８４）. Support generally
came from the upper echelons of the organization, namely the board, for which the consult-
ing firm usually drafted internal communications explaining the new structures and incen-
tive and control systems being put in place. The changes were also espoused by what the
author of that German letter referred to as“careerists”, i.e. those being promoted to some of
the newly created managerial positions such as division head or regional manager（ongoing
research）.
And while the organizational and systemic transformations in some cases forced
the consultants to deal with complicated internal politics and to make ― usually temporary ―
compromises with extant practices and sensibilities（see, e.g. Kipping and Westerhuis ２０１２
for the AMRO case）, this new philosophy sooner or later became enshrined in the decentral-
ized organizational structures, which established clear hierarchical lines of authority and re-
porting, while putting increasing responsibility into the hands of lower level managers, down
to the branch managers and even individual sales people. At the same time, their activities
were directed strategically from the top of the new banking organizations through planning,
budgeting and incentive systems that generally focused on increasing profitability through
higher sales, while maintaining or, ideally, reducing costs. These changes were also under-
pinned by the recruitment of different kinds of people. The“right types”with the“passive-
dependent-submissive”personality, prevalent earlier and described extensively by Argyris
and McMurry（see above）, were replaced by MBA graduates, who had already been taught
the language of management and the guiding principle of profit maximization（Ferraro, Pfef-
fer and Sutton２００５）― though this development took longer outside the US where graduate
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business schools were yet to become the norm（see, e.g. for recruitment in the case of the
British Barclays Bank, Hollow and Vik２０１６）.
Summary and discussion: Should bankers really be managers？
Thus, since the end of the １９６０s, the changes that McMurry and others had sug-
gested for the banking sector were being introduced in the United States and parts of West-
ern Europe, reaching Japan and other Western European countries since the late １９７０s.
And, as shown, McKinsey played a major role in transforming the dignified and conserva-
tive banking“institutions”with their“cathedrallike milieu”into“modern”managerial busi-
nesses. Banks did follow the suggestions by McMurry, Smith and others and became“more
dynamic and aggressive”if one is to believe contemporary observers. Thus, for the division-
alized banks in the UK Channon（１９７８:８６）noted that the“speed of reaction and degree of
aggression certainly appeared to be greater”. And in the case of Citibank in the US, Cleve-
land and Huertas（１９８５: ２８７）also highlighted the benefits from the new organizational
structure and policies in terms of business segments（and individuals）receiving more
autonomy combined with greater accountability, ultimately leading to“a correspondingly
greater marketing thrust”― though they also admitted that it was difficult, if not impossible
to“recognize differences in credit risk among market segments”.
Assessing the same changes at Citibank a decade later, Zweig（１９９５: ２４６, ２５２―２５３,
６０９）came to a more negative conclusion regarding the replacement of“the old-time rela-
tionship banker”with what he called a“management cult”and a“fast-track meritocracy of
Ivey League M.B.A.’s”. He admitted that the“newly decentralized organization gave rise to
a level of entrepreneurship unprecedented in American banking”, but at the same time
pointed out that“the freedom that it afforded proved too much for some managers to han-
dle”, causing“bombshells”in, among others, computer leasing, real estate, tax planning and
foreign exchange dealings. As seen above, Engwall（１９９４）also puts the blame for the Swed-
ish banking crisis squarely into the court of those encouraging the bankers to play poker, i.e.
be more aggressive.
So, on balance, were these changes positive or negative？ That question is impossi-
ble to answer with certainty, since there is no way to establish statistically valid causality
between the transformation of the banking sector and subsequent crises. Though（eco-
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nomic）logic suggests that such a connection exists, namely with respect to the industrial
model used by the consultants as a template for transforming all these banks. As a result,
banks in many respects became“normal”businesses: their organizational structures, their
control and incentive systems, and, very importantly, the self-perception of those directing
them at all levels as being“managers”. However, as we clearly know from the relevant lit-
erature, banks are not normal businesses. Selling cars like General Motors does, is not the
same as selling loans. When people default on these loans, even the ones guaranteed by real
estate, it has consequences not only for the bank providing the mortgages but also, because
of securitization, for the financial sector as a whole and, given the systemic role of banking
and finance, for the broader economy ― as demonstrated by the effects of the Lehman shock
on most countries around the world.
What is also clear, but maybe less obvious to all but a few observers（e.g. Hollow
２０１４）is the crucial role played by those directing the transformed banking organizations.
They set the strategy and provide the incentives driving the behaviour of others in that or-
ganization despite the latter’s supposed“autonomy”― see Countrywide’s“High Speed Swim
Lane”program or Wells Fargo’s unauthorized account openings or extensions, mentioned
above. While under the old systems these decisions tended to be made collectively, after the
managerialization of these banks since the late１９６０s, the buck now truly stops at the top ―
a fact that seems to have escaped prosecutors and the courts, given the absence of indict-
ments, let alone convictions of bank CEOs after the２００８global financial crisis.
In sum, with hindsight it might have been preferable had bankers not become man-
agers as Smith and others had insisted they should. Realistically however, it will be difficult
to turn back the clock, given how profoundly banks and bankers have been transformed in
terms of organizational structures, incentive and control systems as well as self-perception.
So, what can be done beyond the tightening of regulations, which has been the preferred
and largely only policy response after the crisis？ Here, it helps to look at business at large,
where managerial goals have moved, as Sakamoto（２０１３: ７）has suggested, from a focus on
market share and profitability to one on shareholder value and, more recently, on shared
value. While the latter remains more of an aspiration rather than a reality, there are those
pointing to the particular power and responsibility of the large asset owners for espousing a
more long-term view（e.g. Barton and Wiseman ２０１４）, while others stress the potentially
positive role financial and capital markets could play in developing a more inclusive and sus-
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tainable economy（e.g. Zadek２０１６）.
Banks are among the large asset owners and important actors in financial and capi-
tal markets. So, the question has to be why their boards and CEOs do not use the organiza-
tional structures and management tools they have been given since the １９６０s to affect a
positive outcome in terms of promoting a more inclusive, long-term oriented and sustainable
economy rather than incentivizing their employees to open more accounts（even without
their clients’consent）or sell more（dodgy）mortgages and bundle them for（unsuspecting）
investors. For everybody’s sake one can only hope that they come to this realization before
the next financial and economic crisis.
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